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INTRODUCTION 
“Geniuses, just as the stars, must shine without pay.”  So goes 
the Swiss saying on the morality and justice of financial awards for 
inventors.1  Similarly, a memorandum submitted to the Swiss 
 
*    Law degree, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, 1988; LL.M. in Trade 
Regulation, New York University School of Law, New York, N.Y., 2002.  All 
translations in this Article are the author’s own. 
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government circa 1884 by a group of industrialists pleads “[t]hat in 
the interest of the general prosperity of industry and trade, patent 
protection, that cup of sorrows, may pass from [us].”2 
With such strong public feeling against patent protection it is 
no wonder that it took Switzerland—a conservative country where 
national referenda often determine important policy decisions3—
almost half a century to enact its first national patent law in 1888.4  
The law was so limited in scope, however, that its usefulness for 
patent protection was at best dubious.5  Indeed, successful 
lobbying by the Swiss chemical industry resulted in the 1888 
national patent law protecting only inventions that could be 
represented by mechanical models.6  Two decades and some 
international pressure were necessary for the legislature to rectify 
this Swiss anomaly.7  One explanation for this long and laborious 
legislative history can be found in the Swiss constitutional 
requirements.  Switzerland is a federal state with a strict separation 
of powers between the confederation and the cantons, and a patent 
law on a national scale could not be enacted by the federal 
government in the absence of constitutionally granted authority.8  
It was only after three attempts that in 1887 such a constitutional 
mandate was successfully given by the Swiss citizens to the 
 
1 Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 
10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 17 (1950) (quoting WILHELM ROSCHER, 3 SYSTEM DER 
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT 758 (Stuttgart 1881)). 
2 ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS, 
1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907, at 87 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971). 
3 See generally BBC News, Country Profile: Switzerland, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/1035212.stm (last visited Jan. 
28, 2004) (noting that “[u]niquely in Europe, important policy decisions often rest on the 
results of national referenda” and that “the Swiss Confederation’s long-standing neutral 
status has given it political stability that has helped it become one of the world’s 
wealthiest countries”). 
4 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
6 Economic historian Eric Schiff calls the period between 1888 and 1907, when the first 
Swiss national patent law was in effect, “the semi-patentless interlude.” Id. at 86.  He also 
refers to the 1888 law as “probably the most incomplete and selective patent law ever 
enacted in modern times.” Id. at 93. 
6 Id. at 85–86. 
7 See id. at 94–95 (noting that in 1907 the Swiss legislature enacted a law that 
eliminated the “mechanical model” requirement and extended protection to chemical 
processes after pressure from Germany, the biggest market for Swiss chemical products). 
8 Id. at 85. 
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confederation.9  The fourth vote, in 1905, was then necessary to 
expunge the Swiss constitution (“Constitution”) of the previous 
error by removing the “mechanical model” requirement from the 
Constitution—where it never should have been in the first place.10  
Indeed, as patent protection became more prevalent in neighboring 
countries, international opinion turned against Switzerland’s 
industries, which were considered thieves because it was common 
practice among Swiss manufacturers to use foreign inventions.11  
This phenomenon reached its peak during the semi-patentless era 
when Swiss chemical industries were not only still imitating 
German inventions, but also exporting the imitated substances to 
Germany.12  It was only when both the Constitution and the Swiss 
law were modified that it was possible for Switzerland to enter an 
era of patent protection with a true patent law.13 
The multilateral trade system established by the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) agreements, the successor to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), includes the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (“TRIPS 
Agreement”), which entered into force on January 1, 1995.14  The 
TRIPS Agreement was called “the most ambitious international 
intellectual property convention ever attempted.”15  It provides for 
minimal requirements for its members to implement for the 
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property, which 
covers copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs 
(topographies of integrated circuits), as well as the protection of 
 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 86. 
11 See id. at 94. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 86. 
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
15 J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly 
Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363, 366 (1996). 
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undisclosed information.16  The TRIPS Agreement also contains 
measures and procedures designed to enforce those requirements.17  
Because not all WTO member countries are at the same stage of 
development—there are the developed countries, the developing 
countries, and the least developed countries—the TRIPS 
Agreement grants different transition periods for the 
implementation of its obligations.18  Although Switzerland’s 
economic and political situation differs from the current conditions 
in developing countries, its patent history is comparable to the 
challenges that developing countries face in the implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement.19  Indeed, the main difference is that 
nineteenth-century Switzerland, like the other major European 
countries after the industrial revolution, was making the transition 
from an agricultural-based to an industrial-based economy.20  
History indicates that Switzerland’s position was peculiar because, 
unlike its neighbors, it did not have any natural resources.21  This 
did not prevent Switzerland from moving into large-scale industrial 
production, however.22  In addition, although Switzerland did not 
have a true patent protection system for a long period of time, it 
joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (“Paris Convention”) voluntarily,23 unlike the developing 
countries that entered the Uruguay Round as part of a broader 
“package deal.”24 
 
16 Id. at 366 n.12.  A summary of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) objectives and requirements is 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
17 See Reichman, supra note 15, at 368–69. 
18 Id. at 365 n.8; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 65–66. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 195–199. 
20 See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 96. 
21 See id. at 97; see also Harold R. Newman, The Mineral Industry of Switzerland, 2002 
MINERALS Y.B. (U.S. Geological Survey) vol. III, at 23.1, available at 
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/europe.html#sz (last visited Feb. 9, 
2004). 
22 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 97. 
23  Switzerland joined the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property 
on July 7, 1884. See WIPO, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
Contracting Parties, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/index.html (last updated 
Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter WIPO, Paris Convention Parties]. 
24  See, e.g., Adronico Oduogo Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: 
Origins and History of Negotiations, July 30, 2001 (presented at the Eastern and 
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Part I of this Article will provide a brief description of the 
general requirements under the TRIPS Agreements for its member 
countries with regard to patent law.  Part II will recount and 
discuss the legislative history of Switzerland’s patent laws, while 
Part III will present the arguments invoked by the industries that 
have opposed patent protection.  Part IV will also briefly examine 
from an ethical perspective the conduct of the Swiss industries that 
imitated foreign patented inventions during the patentless era 
(before 1888).  The final part will analyze the similarities and 
differences in today’s North-South debate and yesterday’s 
controversy between Switzerland and the members of the Paris 
Convention. 
I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
WTO members are required, under article 1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, to implement minimal intellectual property protections 
that are defined within the agreement.25  Article 2 mandates that 
they comply with articles 1 through 12 and 19 of the Paris 
Convention, as embodied in the Stockholm Act of 1967,26 the 
purpose of which is to grant national treatment to all nationals of 
countries of the European Union in all the industrial property rights 
covered.27  An essential principle embodied in article 4 of the Paris 
Convention is the right of priority for patents.28  The Paris 
Convention does not, however, contain any specification as to the 
scope of patent protection, leaving this choice to the European 
Union members.29 
 
Southern Africa Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual Property and 
Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya), available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2001-
07-30/30-07-01-docu.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). 
25 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1. 
26 See id. art. 2. 
27 Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as 
revised July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], 
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2004). 
28 See id. art. 4. 
29 See, e.g., Dr. Harriet Strimpel, Patents Promote the Useful Arts in a Free Market, 
Center for International Development at Harvard University, at http://www.cid.-
harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments/comments42.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
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The TRIPS Agreement differs in that article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement defines a minimal standard of patentable subject matter 
by specifying that the “patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application.”30  This article further 
provides that there shall be no discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology, and whether the products are 
imported or locally produced.31  The definition was modeled after 
the standards of the developed countries, and contains few 
narrowly defined exceptions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the article.32  
Inventions may be excluded if their commercial exploitation 
violates the ordre public or morality of a given member country.33  
Moreover, if use is inconsistent with diagnostic, therapeutic, and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans, animals, plants, and 
other organisms excluding micro-organisms, or is inconsistent with 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes, such inventions 
may also be excluded.34  It is important to note that under the 
TRIPS Agreement, plant varieties are not included in these 
exceptions and  must be protected by a patent or a special system.35  
The TRIPS Agreement has other minimal requirements, such as 
the twenty-year term of a patent,36 judicial review for the 
revocation or forfeiture of a patent,37 permission for member 
countries to require compulsory licenses subject to certain 
conditions,38 and effective enforcement by the member countries 
of any of the intellectual property rights covered by the 
agreement.39 
 
30 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27. 
31 Id. 
32 See, e.g., Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions 
About Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001). 
33 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. art. 33 (specifying that the twenty-year duration begins at the filing date). 
37 Id. art. 32. 
38 Id. art. 31. 
39 Id. art. 42. 
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According to article 65, member countries have one year from 
the entry into effect of the TRIPS Agreement—that is, until 
January 1, 1996—to implement these minimal requirements.40  The 
developing countries are entitled to four additional years in order 
to harmonize their legislation with the TRIPS Agreement 
standards.41  The four-year period benefits members moving from 
a centrally-planned economy into a market, free-enterprise 
economy who undertake structural reform of their intellectual 
property system and face special problems in the preparation and 
implementation of the intellectual property laws.42  Furthermore, if 
a member country is obligated to introduce patent protection to 
areas of technology not previously protected within its territory, it 
may delay the initiation of such protection for an additional period 
of five years.43  Pursuant to article 70 paragraph 8, however, a 
member country not offering patent protection for pharmaceutical 
and agricultural chemical products in its national law on January 1, 
1995 shall, during the transitional period, provide a means by 
which patent applications for such inventions can be filed—the so-
called “mailbox” provision.44  Finally, pursuant to article 66, the 
least developed countries are entitled to a transition period of 
eleven years from the date of entry into force, which can be 
extended upon duly motivated request.45 
The WTO is novel because of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (“DSU”), annex 2 to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization,46 and the applicable 
TRIPS Agreement dispute settlement process pursuant to article 
64.47  The members have an enforcement mechanism at last.  As 
stated in article 23(2) of the DSU, any unilateral trade sanctions 
 
40 Id. art. 65. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. art. 70. 
45 Id. art. 66. 
46 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
47 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 64. 
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from a WTO member against another for the failure to implement 
the TRIPS Agreement is prohibited: 
[Members shall] not make a determination to the effect that 
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or 
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreements has been impeded, except through 
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules 
and procedures of this Understanding . . . and [shall] obtain 
[Dispute Settlement Body] authorization in accordance 
with those procedures before suspending concessions or 
other obligations under the covered agreements in response 
to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the 
recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period 
of time.48 
The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) may authorize member 
countries to enforce trade sanctions for non-compliance with 
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement only as a means of last resort, 
at the end of the proceedings.49 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. From the Middle Ages Until 1888 
Before analyzing Switzerland’s patent law history, it is 
important to recall some important landmarks of the country’s 
origin and examine specific features of its Constitution.  The first 
 
48 DSU, supra note 46, art. 23. 
49 See id. art. 22; see also WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, The Panel 
Process, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm (displaying, 
by means of a flowchart, the various stages in the dispute settlement process) (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2004).  In spite of the provisions of article 22 of the DSU, the United States 
continues to use its “Special 301” mechanism before any proceedings conclude.  In the 
proceeding commenced by the European Union, although the panel held that section 304 
of the Trade Act of 1974 constitutes a serious threat to article 23 of the DSU, the 
statements made by the United States before the panel removed the prima facie 
inconsistencies and fulfill the guarantees required under article 23. See WTO, REPORT OF 
THE PANEL WT/DS152/R ¶ 7.131 (1999), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/-
DISPUTE/wto/tract40e.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
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or “old” confederation was founded in 1291.50  It was a union of 
three confederates, each of which maintained its independent 
sovereignty.51  This confederation eventually grew during the 
centuries by the admission of new cantons, but remained a union of 
independent confederates until its occupation by Napoleonic 
France in 1798.52  This invasion transformed the confederation into 
the Helvetic Republic, which had a centralized government that 
vitiated the previous autonomy of the cantons.53  The unpopular 
republic, viewed by the people as antithetical to the spirit of 
Switzerland, was abolished in 1803.54  After a transitional period, a 
new federal pact was signed in 1815, reinstalling the former 
confederation—a union of sovereign states without centralized 
power.55 
Modern Switzerland was created in 1848, when the union of all 
twenty-two cantons adopted a constitution modeled after the 
American constitution, under which the cantons agreed to give up 
part of their sovereignty to the confederation.56  All authority not 
expressly attributed to the confederation remains with the 
cantons.57  Switzerland’s legislative power is exercised by the 
Federal Assembly, which is composed of two chambers: the 
National Council and the Council of States, the former being the 
larger one.58 
 
50 Nationmaster.com, Encyclopedia, History of Switzerland, at http://www.-
nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/History-of-Switzerland (article last updated Jan. 6, 
2004). 
51 Id. 
52 History of Switzerland, Swiss Revolution and Helvetic Republic (1798), at 
http://history-switzerland.geschichte-schweiz.ch/swiss-revolution-helvetic-republic-
1798.html (last updated Dec. 30, 2003). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 More precisely, the federal government now controlled the national defense, trade, 
and legal affairs. History of Switzerland, supra note 52.  In 1848, the cantons did not 
grant any rights to the confederation with respect to patent protection. Pierre-André 
Morand, Les Lois Cantonales Relatives aux Brevets [The Cantonal Laws Concerning 
Patents], in KERNPROBLEME DES PATENTRECHTS 3, 4 (Institut für gewerblichen 
Rechtsschutz, INGRES, Zurich 1988). 
57 Morand, supra note 56, at 4. 
58 Nationmaster.com, Europe: Switzerland, Government, at http://www.nationmaster.-
com/country/sz/Government (last visited Jan. 29, 2004). 
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It is often written that Switzerland did not have a patent system 
until the adoption of the patent law of 1888.59  This is not entirely 
accurate, however.  Prior to 1888, various patent protections 
existed, although they were not very significant.  In the Middle 
Ages, under the old confederation, the sovereign cantons could, if 
they wished to do so, grant privileges to inventors.60  Such 
privileges were mainly seen in towns where intellectual, 
commercial, and industrial activities flourished, such as in Basel, 
where in 1531 the legislator granted protection to printed books.61  
Other examples include Berne, where in 1577 privileges were 
given to a citizen for his use and reproduction of original 
apparatuses used to collect salt, and Zurich, where a man received 
protection for a fountain.62 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Helvetic Republic, 
which replaced the old confederation, enacted its first patent law.63  
Article 1 of the law of 1801 allowed a citizen of the Republic who 
invented, improved, or introduced from abroad a new essential 
industry and practiced it in the country, to apply for a patent, which 
was protected for up to seven years.64  This law, however, was 
abolished with the fall of the Helvetic Republic in 1803.65  After 
the transition period that lasted from 1803 until 1815, the old 
confederation system was reinstated.66  Some of the sovereign 
states, but not all, used their competence to enact patent legislation, 
resulting in great diversity.67  In 1832, Zurich was the first canton 
to enact legislation in this area, but the law appears to never have 
been used.68  In September of 1837, Basel-Stadt granted protection 
for inventions in its a criminal law, but never described the 
 
59 See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 86–87. 
60 Morand, supra note 56, at 4. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 5. 
63 Switzerland’s first patent law was enacted on April 25, 1801. Id. at 7; see also Hans 
Bracher, Entstehung und bedeutung des schweizerischen patentwesens [Coming into 
Existence and Meaning of the Nature of the Swiss Patent], at 5, 6 (1923). 
64 Bracher, supra note 63, at 5; Morand, supra note 56, at 7. 
65 Morand, supra note 56, at 9; see also supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
66 See Morand, supra note 56, at 9. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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conditions to be met in order to receive protection.69  Solothurn 
introduced patent protection in its civil code in 1847, but included 
it in the chapter devoted to illicit acts.70  Finally, the canton of 
Thurgovie did not pass legislation, but included in its constitution 
an affirmation under which intellectual property was protected.71  
In general, the protection granted appears vague and narrow, 
limited to the specific canton.72  Most of the other cantons did not 
legislate on this matter, mainly because they felt that patents did 
not need particular protection.73  Diversity in legislation favored 
the protectionism of the cantons to the detriment of the national 
interest.74 
This state of affairs continued until the adoption of a federal 
patent law on November 15, 1888.75  This legislation, however, 
was not adopted without long debates, much opposition, and 
considerable compromise.  As early as 1849, a year after the birth 
of the federal state, a member of the Council of States submitted to 
colleagues the draft of a patent law and urged them to adopt it 
promptly.76  This motion was followed by a second motion in the 
same year;77  however, both were both rejected, as was a petition 
filed in 1852.78  The basis for the rejections was that the 
confederation was not competent to pass laws in this matter 
because there was no express clause in the Constitution that 
enabled such action.79  As a result, in 1854, the Federal Council, at 
the request of the National Council, examined the possibility of 
granting such protection through a treaty, or concordat, between 
the cantons.80  Despite repeated efforts over the next few years to 
 
69 Id. at 10. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 11. 
72 Id. at 12. 
73 Other cantons that enacted legislation to protect intellectual property did not clearly 
define the scope of protection and often did not extend the protection to patents. See id. at 
11–12. 
74 Id. at 12. 
75 Id. at 16. 
76 Id. at 14. 
77 Id. at 14–15. 
78 Id. at 15. 
79 Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6. 
80 Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6. 
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implement this solution, however, it was rejected due to cantonal 
disagreement.81  Further rejection of a Swiss patent regime 
followed in 1863, when a new proposal was dismissed by the 
government “with reference to the fact that political economists of 
greatest competence had declared that the principle of patent 
protection was pernicious and indefensible.”82 
In 1864, Switzerland signed a bilateral treaty with France,83 
pursuant to which the citizens of both countries could require of 
each other exclusive protection for their trademarks as well as their 
artistic and literary works.84  The treaty did not address the 
protection of patents, despite France’s efforts to include it.85  The 
signing of this treaty signaled to Switzerland the urgency of 
enacting legislation to protect intellectual property, especially 
because all Switzerland had at the time was a concordat between 
some of the cantons for the protection of literary and artistic 
property.86  Thus, in 1865, the Federal Assembly submitted for the 
first time a referendum for an amendment to the Constitution to 
grant the confederation the power to legislate intellectual property 
matters.87  This proposition, however, was rejected by the popular 
vote held on January 14, 1866.88 
Those in favor of a national patent law did not renounce the 
cause and continued to pursue their efforts both in Switzerland and 
abroad.  Two motions were filed by a representative of the 
 
81 Morand, supra note 56, at 15; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 6–7. 
82 Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 5 (citations omitted); see also Roland 
Grossenbacher, Die Schweiz und die PVÜ [Switzerland and the Paris Convention], in 
KERNPROBLEME DES PATENTRECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT ZUM EINHUNDERTJÄHRIGEN BESTEHEN 
EINES EIDGENÖSSISCHEN PATENTGESETZES 389 (Institut für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 
INGRES, Stämpfli 1988). 
83 France already had enacted a new patent law in 1844. Morand, supra note 56, at 12–
13. 
84 Id. at 13. 
85 Bracher, supra note 63, at 8; Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 389. 
86 Morand, supra note 56, at 13; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 7. 
87 See Morand, supra note 56, at 15.  A referendum is compulsory for all amendments 
to the Swiss Constitution (“Constitution”), and a double majority is needed for the 
amendment to take place.  This means that both a majority of the popular vote and a 
majority of the cantons in which the majority of the voters adopted the proposal are 
required. 
88 The proposal was rejected by a margin of 40,000 votes. Id.; see also Bracher, supra 
note 63, at 7–8. 
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National Council in 1871 and 1873.89  Both were rejected, 
however, one of them on the basis that Switzerland was 
purportedly too small to have patent laws.90  These setbacks did 
not prevent the proponents from actively participating in the 
international realm and further advocating international protection.  
The advocates brought forth their cases at the two privately 
organized congresses concerning patent protection held at the 
Universal Exhibition in Vienna in 1873 and in Paris in 1878 
(referred to as Congrès du Trocadero).91  In 1880, Switzerland was 
also represented at the Paris Convention, the first diplomatic 
conference regarding patents.92  Switzerland played an important 
role in drafting the text of the Paris Convention, which was 
eventually signed on March 20, 1883.93  This is the primary reason 
why Berne was chosen as the headquarters for the Central Bureau 
of the Union, which was in charge of the administration and 
supervision of the convention.94 
Because the text of the Paris Convention and the pending 
motions were sent to the states by France in November 1880, 
Switzerland was able to take advantage of the impact of the 1880 
conference.95  On February 8, 1881, the National Council was 
urged to submit to the citizen vote a new amendment to the 
Constitution to add article 64bis.  Pursuant to this new article, the 
confederation would be granted the necessary power to protect 
industrial and agricultural inventions as well as offer protection for 
designs and models.96  In its message of support for this 
amendment, the Federal Council emphasized the number of 
countries that had laws concerning patent protection and that 
 
89 Bracher, supra note 63, at 8, 16; Walther Stuber, Die Patentirbarkeit chemischer 
Erfindungen [The Patentability of Chemical Inventions], in ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM 
SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHT, Heft 20, at 7 (1907). 
90 See Morand, supra note 56, at 14; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 8. 
91 Morand, supra note 56, at 13; see also Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391. 
92 Morand, supra note 56, at 13; WIPO, Paris Convention Parties, supra note 23.  
93 Morand, supra note 56, at 13; Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391; WIPO, Paris 
Convention Parties, supra note 23. 
94 Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391–92. 
95 From 1875 to 1881, different voices were raised in favor of a national patent law, 
and motions as well as petitions were filed both at the national and states councils. See 
Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 391–92. 
96 Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 392–93; Bracher, supra note 63, at 8–9. 
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favored Berne as the seat for the Central Bureau of the Union.  The 
National Council also warned that the absence of a patent 
protection system could leave the Swiss inventors behind and 
might create an exodus of highly qualified specialists.97  Despite 
these seemingly strong arguments, the amendment was rejected by 
the Swiss citizenry in 1882.98  One explanation is that the vote was 
influenced by the fact that on the same day, the population also 
voted on an unpopular law concerning the control of contagious 
diseases and epidemics.99  Regardless of the reason, the negative 
outcome turned out to have far more consequences than those 
foreseen at the time.  Indeed, up to that point, the chemical 
industry had not brought about strong resistance against the 
amendment because the text voted on was neutral in that it did not 
contain the model requirement that existed in the version submitted 
to the people in July 1887.100  The adoption of the 1881 proposal 
would have saved much time and energy.  More importantly, it 
would have avoided the need for the second constitutional 
modification, which came in 1906.101 
Even though Berne was designated as the headquarters of the 
Central Bureau of the Union, the reality was that Switzerland was 
still without a patent law when the Paris Convention was signed in 
March 1883.102  This failure, however, did not prevent the 
proponents of patent protection to continue their efforts.  A motion 
was filed in 1883 to determine whether this question should be 
submitted to the citizens once more, despite the initial negative 
outcome.103  Many petitions in favor of establishing a patent law 
were filed104  and, during the assembly of the delegates of the Paris 
Convention in Rome in early 1886, it was requested that the 
countries that did not yet protect all types of intellectual property 
 
97 Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 393. 
98 Morand, supra note 56, at 15. 
99 Grossenbacher, supra note 82, at 393 n.11; Alfred Simon, Der Patentschutz mit 
besonderer berücksichtigung der schweizerischen gesetzgebung [The Patent Protection 
with a Special Emphasis on Swiss Statute] 32 (1891); Stuber, supra note 89, at 11. 
100 Stuber, supra note 89, at 11. 
101 Id. 
102 See Morand, supra note 56, at 15. 
103 Id. at 15–16. 
104 Morand, supra note 56, at 15–16. 
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should do so without further delay.105  In light of the foregoing, the 
National Council again delivered a message on June 1, 1886 in 
favor of the addition of article 64bis to the Constitution.106  On 
July 10, 1887, the voters finally agreed by a large majority to grant 
the confederation the competence to enact patent legislation.107 
The powers given to the Swiss government, however, were 
limited in scope because the legislation that could be passed was 
limited to inventions represented by mechanical models applicable 
to the industry.108  This peculiarity made Switzerland’s legislation 
unique because no other country had such a requirement.109  A 
better way to draft the constitutional clause would have been to 
give it a broader scope, thus, allowing the legislation to carve 
narrower requirements.110  This constraint was defined in article 14 
of the 1888 patent law, and stated that a model of the invention 
comprised any execution of the invention or any artistic 
representation that clearly showed the nature and object of the 
invention.111  Its main goal was to exclude chemical inventions to 
avoid the strong opposition of the chemical industry, which had 
challenged all other versions of the amendment.112  According to 
the National Council, this requirement was supposed to have two 
other advantages.  First, it was intended to exclude all inventions 
that were not ripe enough or for those in which the inventor was 
 
105 Simon, supra note 99, at 33. 
106 See Morand, supra note 56, at 16; Simon, supra note 99, at 33. 
107 Morand, supra note 56, at 16. 
108 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
109 Id. at 86. 
110 Stuber, supra note 89, at 18.  The author concurs with Walther Stuber that such detail 
had no place in the Constitution. 
111 Loi fédérale sur les brevets d’invention, du 29 juin 1888, publié au Recueil officiel 
des lois et ordonnaces de la Confédération Suisse, nouvelle série, tome X, 1888, 688-689, 
[Federal Patent Law of June 29, 1888, published in the official report of the laws and 
regulations of the Swiss Confederation, new series, vol. X, pp. 688–89]. 
112 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’assemblée fédérale concernant le projet de loi sur les 
brevets d’invention, 20 janvier 1888, FF 1888 I 187, 189 [Message from the Federal 
Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the draft law about patentable inventions] 
[hereinafter Message of 1888]; Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif 
à la revision de l’article 64 de la Constitution fédérale, 13 novembre 1903, FF 1903 V 47, 
49, 50 [Message from the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the 
modification of article 64 of the Swiss Federal Constitution] [hereinafter Message of 
1903]. 
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not able to fully describe the implementation.113  Second, the 
model requirement was believed to facilitate procedural steps in 
patent infringement disputes.114  The model requirement left out 
inventions for chemical and pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs, 
and stimulants.115 
B. From 1888 to the Law of 1907 
Soon after the patent law of 1888 entered into force, voices 
were raised about the inappropriateness of the model requirement: 
This restriction finds no justification in the law; indeed 
there is no justification to create a special category with the 
inventions that can be represented by a model; the 
possibility of a model is a completely secondary 
circumstance, which has nothing to do with the nature of 
the invention; no substantial legal argument has been 
seriously invoked in favor of the adopted system.116 
Furthermore, this model requirement, which at first seemed to 
have a straightforward application and was supposed to ease the 
work of the Intellectual Property Office, led to uncertainties due to 
its lack of clarity.117  There was an interpretation discrepancy 
regarding the scope of application—more precisely, determining 
which invention could actually be represented by a model.118  
Since no case was ever brought to the supreme court of 
Switzerland, the Tribunal fédéral suisse (Federal Tribunal), this 
question remained unresolved.119  Additionally, “[d]oubts were 
soon raised as to whether Switzerland, in enacting so selective a 
 
113 Message of 1888, supra note 112; Message of 1903, supra note 112. 
114 Message of 1888, supra note 112; Message of 1903, supra note 112; see also Simon, 
supra note 99, at 55. 
115 Simon, supra note 99, at 59. 
116 Stuber, supra note 89, at 3 (quoting J. Spiro: “Cette restriction ne se justifie pas en 
droit; il n’y a en effet aucune raison de faire des inventions représentables par modèle une 
catégorie spéciale; la possibilité d’un modèle est une circonstance tout à fait accessoire et 
qui ne touche en rien à l’essence de l’invention; aucun argument juridique n’a d’ailleurs 
été sérieusement invoqué en faveur du système adopté”). 
117 Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 52; see also SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 93. 
118 See Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 52. 
119 Id. 
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law, had really met her moral obligations as a Member of the 
International Union.”120 
Early on, some discrepancies appeared in the three official 
versions of the text—French, German, and Italian121—requiring 
some minor modifications of the law, which were undertaken in 
1893.122  At that time, it was not possible to drop the model 
requirement because it was not only embedded in the law, but also 
in the Constitution.123  A constitutional amendment, therefore, was 
necessary.  This process was much more burdensome because it 
required a new popular vote on the legislative proposal.124  It was 
only a decade later in 1904 that the Parliament agreed to submit to 
the citizens an amendment to article 64bis of the Constitution that 
would drop the model requirement.125  The vote was favorable, and 
the change was accepted on March 19, 1905.126  The law 
subsequently was changed on June 21, 1907.127 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, the following 
circumstances also prompted this change.  First, the Swiss 
government realized that based on the experiences of other 
countries, it was possible to grant protection to chemical inventions 
in a way that suited the Swiss industries.128  Second, it recognized 
that a balanced patent law could benefit the entire economy.129  
Third, it took notice of the current absence of abolitionist views in 
the industrialized countries—in other words, the trend was to 
improve, and not eliminate, the existing patent laws.130  In fact, it 
would have been illogical to deny patent protection to the chemical 
 
120 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 93. 
121 Bracher, supra note 63, at 11. 
122 Stuber, supra note 89, at 2. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif au projet d’une loi 
fédérale sur les brevets d’invention, 17 juillet 1906, FF 1906 IV 325, 326 [Message from 
the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the draft of a federal law about 
patentable inventions of July 17, 1906] [hereinafter Message of 1906]. 
126 Id. 
127 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 86. 
128 See Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 50. 
129 See id. at 50–51. 
130 Id. at 51. 
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industries when the other industries whose products were covered 
by the existing patent law benefited from it.131 
At the same time, the chemical industry had loosened its 
opposition, although not completely.132  It was still opposed to 
patent protection for the application processes, the methods of 
fabricating pharmaceuticals, the production of food and stimulants, 
as well as the products themselves.133  What also weighed in the 
balance was, on one hand, the proposal made by the United States 
to amend the Paris Convention by adding a clause under which 
“any invention that is not patentable in the country of origin, may 
be excluded from protection in any other Member country that 
finds it expedient to include it.”134  This proposition was contrary 
to the spirit of the Paris Convention and presumably would not 
have been accepted by the majority of the members of the 
European Union, but Switzerland did not want to risk the 
recurrence of such proposals, or worse, acts of retaliation.135  On 
the other hand, the German government did threaten Switzerland 
with retaliatory measures.  Specifically, the German government 
threatened the imposition of custom duties on the import of certain 
chemical products from Switzerland, such as aniline and other 
coal-tar dyestuffs, if the patent law was not modified to include the 
protection of chemical inventions by December 31, 1907.136 
It is these two last circumstances which had, in reality, the 
most impact on Switzerland’s decision.  Professor Heinrich 
Kronstein and Doctor Irene Till shed an interesting view on these 
episodes of the Paris Convention that is worth citing here: 
In at least one specific instance Germany did use the 
International Patent Convention to cement its monopolistic 
position.  This was in connection with Switzerland.  At the 
turn of the century Switzerland loomed as a real 
 
131 See id. at 52. 
132 See Message of 1906, supra note 125, at 326. 
133 Id. 
134 This U.S. proposal was made at the 1897 Conference of the Union in Brussels. 
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 93. 
135 See Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 54–55; see also SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 89–
90, 93–95. 
136 EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
16–17 (1951); SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 94–95; Stuber, supra note 89, at 27–28. 
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competitive threat to Germany’s dyestuffs industry; and it 
persistently refused to grant patents for the protection of 
chemical processes.  In this case the United States came to 
the aid of Germany.  At the 1897 patent convention in 
Brussels, the United States—with no dyestuff industry of 
its own—proposed that Switzerland should be punished for 
its dereliction in the chemical field by discriminatory 
measures against it.  Was this an expression of the 
American-German patent alliance?  In 1904 Germany sent 
a virtual ultimatum to Switzerland, demanding that it grant 
patents on chemical processes under the patent 
convention’s requirement of equality of treatment to 
nationals and foreigners.  To force compliance, it 
threatened Switzerland with an import tariff on Swiss 
goods based on the total volume of its exports into 
Germany. 
The Swiss parliamentary debates of 1904 and 1907 give a 
dramatic account of the conflict.  From one side comes the 
charge that Switzerland is opposed to the grant of chemical 
patents because she wishes to enrich her own industries by 
securing technological developments from abroad for 
nothing.  The defense of those opposed to the grant of such 
patents is that they inevitably lead to monopoly; and the 
German dyestuffs industry is cited as the prime example.  
The very fact that the German government and the German 
chemical industry were demanding that Switzerland grant 
chemical patents was taken as an indication that the real 
purpose was to compel Swiss industry to join the German 
dyestuffs cartel.  History proved that this charge was 
correct, for in the end the Swiss industry was compelled to 
become a junior partner in the German dyestuffs group.137 
Switzerland’s resistance was finally overcome.  Whether this 
was a welcome change depends on the viewpoint of patentees and 
consumers, respectively.  The new patent law clearly benefited the 
patent holders and the German industry, who gained a 
 
137 Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Reevaluation of the International Patent 
Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 778–79 (1947). 
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monopoly.138  On the other hand, the consumer had to pay more for 
the same products once the Swiss competition was destroyed.139  It 
should be noted, however, that the scope of the new patent law 
adopted on June 21, 1907 was still limited because only chemical 
processes were protected and not chemical products or substances 
themselves.140  Furthermore, the new law excluded the protection 
of all chemical processes related to the fabrication of products, 
whether chemically or not, for human or animal nutrition.141  The 
serien-patente on chemical processes, as well as the chemical 
processed for the treatment of textile fibers, were also excluded 
from protection.142  Despite the large gaps in protection, this was in 
fact not the last Swiss resistance to the German industry.  Section 4 
of the German law in effect at that time also excluded from its 
scope inventions on food, stimulants, or pharmaceutical products, 
as well as chemically-produced substances, as long as the 
invention did not concern a specific process for the production of 
the object.143 
III. THE REASONS FOR THIS OPPOSITION 
A. The General Reasons 
The arguments raised by the opponents were diverse, but can 
be summarized and categorized as follows: 
• The protection of inventions did not bring any advantages; 
on the contrary, it was only giving the state more work than 
necessary.144 
• “The principle of patent protection is pernicious and 
indefensible.”145 
 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 95. 
141 Bracher, supra note 63, at 33. 
142 PENROSE, supra note 136, at 17; Bracher, supra note 63, at 34. 
143 See Stuber, supra note 89, at 51. 
144 Bracher, supra note 63, at 13. 
145 Morand, supra note 56, at 15. 
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• “[I]t is pure fantasy to believe that the protection of 
inventions would result in greater activity or encouragement 
of workers.”146 
• “The inventing spirit . . . follows his ideas, not for gain but 
driven by an inner compulsion which will not let him 
rest.”147 
• Switzerland was too small to have patent protection;148 such 
a law would only be efficient in larger countries or 
internationally.149 
• A major invention was generally not achieved by the work 
of one person, but was the result of the general development 
in the industry, or the work of a group of inventors.150  
Therefore, it was unfair to grant a patent, which resulted to a 
monopoly for the inventor who was lucky enough to come 
up with the last inventive step or final touch on an invention, 
and reap all the advantages and economic rewards to the 
detriment of the others.151 
• Patents were considered useless, since Switzerland’s 
industries were able to expand successfully and reach high 
levels of productivity and quality without patent 
protection.152 
Furthermore, patents were considered damaging because they 
could prevent the free use of foreign industries.153  In addition, 
granting patents was seen as a hindrance to free trade.154  The 
Swiss industries also feared that the enactment of a patent law 
would lead to a massive importation of goods protected by 
 
146 PENROSE, supra note 136, at 37 (citing a silk industry manufacturer’s response to a 
survey published in 1886 by the Zurich Chamber of Commerce). 
147 Id. (citing a pottery industry manufacturer’s response to a survey published in 1886 
by the Zurich Chamber of Commerce). 
148 Morand, supra note 56, at 14. 
149 In this respect, the opponents referred to the Netherlands, a country that had 
abolished its patent law in 1869, saying that patent protection could only work if done on 
an international scale. Bracher, supra note 63, at 8, 16. 
150 Morand, supra note 56, at 14. 
151 Simon, supra note 99, at 8; Bracher, supra note 63, at 17. 
152 Morand, supra note 56, at 14. 
153 Id.; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 14–15. 
154 Id.; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 14–15. 
RITTER FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:14 PM 
484 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:463 
patents.155  These views were expressed in a survey published by 
the Zurich Chamber of Commerce in 1886: 
The majority of the big industrialists of Zurich are not in 
favor of the granting of patents.  They do not wish to give 
up the freedom to make use of the improvements of foreign 
competitors as they see fit.  Many see in the present 
situation the last advantage, which remains, to them in 
foreign competition and they do not wish to see it wrenched 
from their hand.  This is held to be the case—as we 
especially set out—not only with respect to imitation but 
also particularly with respect to the free development of the 
play of forces.  This attitude is connected, we must record 
for the sake of truth, with consideration of tariff policy.156 
These views were echoed in a report to the federal department 
of commerce and agriculture: 
Above all, people feared that it [a patent law] would 
facilitate the introduction of foreign manufactured goods by 
the foreign holders of Swiss patents because of our own 
tariff policy, and we should expect a real flood to the harm 
of our own industry.157 
In response to this fear, the advocates of patent protection 
enacted a working requirement and compulsory licensing: 
This disadvantage is easily overcome; compulsory working 
will be introduced in any patent law to be created.  It is in 
the contract connected with the issue of a patent that the 
invention as a rule should promote domestic needs and 
advance domestic technique.  Without such provision half 
of the present patent protection would certainly refuse their 
support.158 
 
155 PENROSE, supra note 136, at 122–23. 
156 Id. (quoting Zurich Chamber of Commerce survey results published in 1886). 
157 Id. at 123 (quoting Bericht an das Eidg. Handels- und Landwirthschafts-Departement 
[report to the federal department of commerce and agriculture]). 
158 Id. at 123 (citing Zurich Chamber of Commerce survey results published in 1886). 
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The patent law of 1888 did contain such requirements in article 
9, sections 3 and 4.  Specifically, the law stated that the patent 
would be cancelled 
if the invention has not been worked after the expiration of 
three years from the date of the application for a patent 
[and] if the patented object is introduced into Switzerland 
from abroad and the holder of the patent has refused a 
license requested by a Swiss on reasonable terms.159 
As an alternative to patent protection, the anti-patent 
movement suggested that the state should reward the inventor 
through a specific fund to be established.160  A suggestion was 
made in 1865 to set up this fund internationally.161  This proposal 
was never implemented because it presented too many obstacles.  
The first obstacle was the difficulty in raising the amount of money 
necessary to reward numerous inventions.162  The second obstacle 
was the question of how to ascertain the amount of the reward to 
be allocated.163  This was the general view prevailing amongst all 
industries in the mid-eighteenth century when the first proposition 
for patent protection was introduced.164 
These opinions were also widespread amongst the 
parliamentarians.165  As a result, the proponents of patent law saw 
many of their motions and petitions rejected for many years.166 
Opinions evolved, however.  The general hostility was lifted 
with the economic crisis that started in Europe in 1873.167  
Confronted with harsh economic times, countries tend to generate 
protectionist measures such as patent protection.  Switzerland’s 
lawmakers realized the advantages of the patents, namely, that 
patents could preserve the national industry from foreign 
 
159 PENROSE, supra note 136, at 124 n.18 (citations omitted). 
160 Simon, supra note 99, at 6. 
161 Simon, supra note 99, at 6; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 17, 18. 
162 Bracher, supra note 63, at 18. 
163 Simon, supra note 99, at 6. 
164 Bracher, supra note 63, at 18, 19. 
165 Id. 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 89–94. 
167 Morand, supra note 56, at 14. 
RITTER FORMAT 3/31/2004  4:14 PM 
486 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:463 
competition.168  They started thinking that the absence of patent 
law actually could be prejudicial to their industry.169  They also 
relied on the example set by the United States which demonstrated 
that a country could enact strong patent protection while achieving 
a high level of development in the industry.170  The chemical 
industry was not so easily convinced by these arguments, however, 
and kept fighting against strong patent laws.171 
B. The Chemical Industry 
In addition to the general arguments raised and summarized 
above, the chemical and paint industries brought up the following 
contentions against a patent protection in their field: 
• Based on experiences in other countries, a clear process 
could not be followed to suit patent chemical substances or 
chemical reactions.172 
• In the chemical field it was often difficult to know who the 
inventor was because chemical inventions were generally a 
series of chemical reactions.173  Therefore, there was a risk 
that a patent could be granted to an individual who just 
stepped in at the end of the process and did not contribute a 
lot of work, but simply put the final touch on the invention.  
Such persons should not be entitled to reap all the benefits 
and advantages of a patent.174 
• Patents hindered the growth of the chemical industry.175  
Unlimited freedom, as known in Switzerland, was more 
favorable to the development of the industry than patent 
protection.176  Germany, whose industry had a stronger 
 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.; see also Bracher, supra note 63, at 23. 
171 See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
172 Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 50. 
173 Stuber, supra note 89, at 9–10. 
174 Id. 
175 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 94. 
176 See id. 
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expansion before the patent era, was an example of the 
downfalls of patent law.177 
• A patent application was a costly proceeding, which can be 
too expensive for small inventors.178  Hence, if inventors did 
not have enough funds, they had two solutions, renounce 
their patent opportunity or give it to big a manufacturer.  
The consequence of this cost of patenting an invention was 
that the monopoly would end up, in most cases, in the hands 
of the big industries and not in those of small inventors, who 
would lose all the advantages that patent protection was 
designed to give them.179 
• In many countries, only the manufacturing process was 
protected, but not the product itself.180  With certain 
products, however, it was impossible to know if they had 
been manufactured using the patented invention or another 
process.  Difficulties might have arisen, therefore, if two 
competing manufacturers were making the same product, 
but only one of them was using the patented process.  
Money would then be lost in infringement proceedings, 
instead of being invested.181 
• If there were only one method of making a product, then the 
patent holder would have undue power.182 
• Since only the manufacturing processes were patentable, and 
not the chemical reactions, it would be difficult to draw a 
line between these two notions and establish whether there 
was an invention.183 
 
177 Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 21.  This assertion, however, is historically 
untrue.  German chemical industries further flourished and developed even after the 
patent law was enacted in 1877. Stuber, supra note 89, at 13–14.  This was most certainly 
due in part to the monopoly position this industry gained in Germany. Kronstein & Till, 
supra note 137, at 779. 
178 Stuber, supra note 89, at 9. 
179 Id. at 8. 
180 Id. at 9. 
181 Stuber, supra note 89, at 8. 
182 Id. 
183 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 92; Stuber, supra note 89, at 9–10. 
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Since the Swiss chemical industry primarily argued that it 
wished to continue to freely imitate the inventions protected by 
patents in foreign countries,184 this Article will briefly examine the 
ethicality of such an attitude. 
IV.  THE QUESTION OF THE ETHICS OF THE SWISS INDUSTRIES  
The moral principles underlying the attitude of the Swiss 
industries toward patents can be analyzed from both legal and 
philosophical perspectives.  From the legal standpoint, the answer 
is usually straightforward because it depends on whether the law 
confers exclusive rights to the patentee.  If there are no such rights 
granted, the invention is available to everyone and mere copying 
does not pose ethical problems.  This is the same situation as when 
the invention cannot be patented due to lack of novelty or any 
other requirement set in the law—the invention falls in the public 
domain.  On the other hand, if the invention is removed from the 
public domain through the grant of an exclusive property right to 
the inventor, then, as with any other property right, it is illegal and, 
hence, unethical to imitate it.  It is important to keep in mind that 
the laws under which property rights are granted usually have 
effects limited to the territory of the country that enacted them.  A 
gap necessarily will exist if not all the countries grant the same 
protection, as it was the case with Switzerland and Germany.  This 
is precisely what the TRIPS Agreement seeks to remedy by 
providing a minimum standard of protection that the Members are 
obligated to implement in their own national laws.185 
The philosophical perspective offers a different theory for the 
protection of intellectual property rights against piracy.  This 
theory is known as a natural property right, under which 
 
184 Amongst the inventions that were invented abroad and exploited in Switzerland is 
the aniline dye (“mauve”) invented and patented in England by William Perkin in 1856. 
SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 100.  A dyeing factory in Basel started manufacturing it as soon 
as 1859. Id.  In the next decade, the artificial dye factories were flourishing in 
Switzerland. Id.  They were not only using techniques developed in foreign countries, 
however, but also those processes they had realized themselves. Id. at 109–10.  
Inventions made by Zenobe T. Gramme and Werner Siemens were also used by an 
engineer to build generators. Id. at 105–06. 
185 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1 
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[a] man has a natural property right in his own ideas.  Their 
appropriation by others must be condemned as stealing.  
Society is morally obligated to recognize and protect this 
property right.  Property is in essence exclusive.  Hence 
enforcement of exclusivity in the use of a patented 
invention is the only appropriate way for society to 
recognize this property right.186 
This idea of a natural property right, which is not a universally 
accepted principle in international law, was one argument raised by 
proponents in favor of patent protection.  For example, this theory 
was extremely popular in France, so much that it was embedded in 
the patent law of 1791.187  It was later abandoned, however, 
because taken literally, it would have meant that a patent granted 
on the basis of a natural right could not be limited in time, which 
would have been unacceptable even to the patent advocates.188 
Nonetheless, this principle of natural property right could be 
used as a standard in cases of imitation: 
So long as the idea of the inventor’s natural property right 
influences the thinking, it is difficult to avoid the corollary 
notion that imitation is unethical even when no written law 
or treaty and no consideration of good international 
sportsmanship forbids it. . . . When the “natural-rights” idea 
is rejected, objections to imitation must be based on 
grounds other than general philosophical ethics.189 
The German industries recognized that the property rights to 
their inventions, as well as the more general property right to their 
ideas, extended beyond the geographical constraints of the German 
borders.190  As such, they considered the Swiss who imitated their 
inventions thieves.191  The Swiss had mixed reactions to this 
accusation.  Some were indifferent, emphasizing that “[the Swiss] 
 
186 Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 10; see also PENROSE, supra note 136, at 21. 
187 Machlup & Penrose, supra note 1, at 11; see also PENROSE, supra note 136, at 21–
22. 
188 See PENROSE, supra note 136, at 24. 
189 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 74. 
190 See id. at 94. 
191 Id. 
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industry has reached its present stage of development only because 
it was able to exact tribute from the foreigner—if this is thievery, 
then all our industries are thieves.”192  Others denounced such 
statements, especially when German industries tried to eliminate 
this “illegal” competition by paying large sums of money to the 
Swiss in exchange for the promise that they would stop imitating 
the German products.193  It is ironic that in this type of situation, 
the thieves were actually compensated for their prior theft.194 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE UNDER THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE SWISS PATENT LAW HISTORY 
In the 2002 Special 301 Report of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Robert B. Zoellick indicates that more than two 
years after the end of the transition period, some WTO member 
countries still did not fully implement in their national laws all the 
patent-related requirements contained in the TRIPS Agreement.195  
Switzerland’s struggles to enact a patent law in the nineteenth 
century may shed some light on these difficulties. 
History shows that there are two key reasons for the 
Switzerland’s delay in adhering to the TRIPS Agreement, namely, 
the opposition of the industries—mainly the chemical ones—and 
the constitutional and legislative requirements specific to 
Switzerland.196  Despite this opposition, changes were possible due 
to international pressure and adjustments in the national perception 
of patent rights.197  The positive experience of other countries 
demonstrated to the Swiss government and industries that a patent 
system was not the “cup of sorrows” initially thought;198  when 
 
192 Id. at 88 n.6. 
193 Id. at 89 n.7. 
194 Id. at 89 n.7; see also Stuber, supra note 89, at 39–40. 
195 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REP., available at http://www.ustr.-
gov/reports/2002/special301.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).  This report lists Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, and Uruguay among the developing 
countries that have not fully implemented their patent obligations. 
196 See generally SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
197 See id. at 87–89. 
198 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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soundly applied, it benefited not only the industries themselves, 
but also the national economy.199 
Hence, the analysis in this part will focus on three specific 
issues: (1) how the role of the political structure of a country can 
influence the implementation of their international obligations, (2) 
to what extend does international pressure have an impact on the 
government of a country, and (3) whether the experience of some 
nations influences the thought process of others. 
A. Impact of the Political Structure 
The TRIPS Agreement grants developing and least developed 
countries up to ten years to implement their obligations and 
introduce patent legislation in areas where such laws are absent.200  
It took Switzerland fifty-eight years to enact a “real” patent law.201  
Even after it did, the scope of its protection was much narrower 
than that required by article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement.202  
Taking into account the time elapsed after the signing of the 1883 
Paris Convention, it can be seen that it still took Switzerland more 
than two decades to comply with its international obligations under 
the convention.  This argument presupposes that the patent law of 
1888 was not suitable to the members of the European Union due 
to its peculiar mechanical model requirement. 
As suggested above, this is significantly due to the political 
structure of this federal state.  It took three voting attempts to 
finally amend the Constitution to grant the confederation the 
requisite authority.203  When the Amendment finally passed in 
1886, the clause was so narrow that the Constitution had to be 
amended again before the law could be modified.204  Since a 
popular vote is seen as a test to gauge how the citizens respond to a 
 
199 Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 51. 
200 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 65–66. 
201 The time period from 1849, a year after the constitution of the federal state, until 
1907. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
202 For example, the “chemical substances,” which are the products of the processes, are 
still not protected by the law of 1907. SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 95.  Article 27 of the 
TRIPS Agreement requires that both processes and products be protected. TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27. 
203 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 85. 
204 Id. at 85. 
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particular proposal or political position, if the motion is rejected, 
the government will be reluctant to immediately return with the 
same amendment proposal because it would not be well perceived 
by the people.  This illustrates that had the TRIPS Agreement been 
signed in 1883 instead of the Paris Convention, Switzerland never 
would have met the requirements within the limited transition 
period, of one, five, or even eleven years.  Considering the 
restricted subject matter of the 1888 patent law, drafted in a 
manner as to overcome the opposition of the chemical industries, it 
would have been totally unsatisfactory with respect to article 27 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. 
Some of the developing countries that are WTO members, 
despite lack of full compliance with the requirements of the TRIPS 
Agreement, are nonetheless striving to implement the necessary 
legislation, but have difficulty because of factors such as political 
structure and pressure from opponents.205  India, for example, was 
involved in a dispute settlement procedure initiated against it by 
the United States which claimed that it violated patent protection 
provisions regarding pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products by not having implemented an adequate filing system for 
such patent applications.206  India argued that 
[t]he Government of India’s initial preference for 
establishing a “means” for filing mailbox applications 
under Article 70.8(a) was the Patents (Amendment) 
Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), promulgated by the President 
of India on 31 December 1994 pursuant to Article 123 of 
India’s Constitution.  Article 123 enables the President to 
promulgate an ordinance when Parliament is not in session, 
and when the President is satisfied “that circumstances 
exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate 
action.”  India notified the Ordinance to the Council for 
TRIPS, pursuant to Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
on 6 March 1995.  In accordance with the terms of Article 
123 of India’s Constitution, the Ordinance expired on 26 
 
205 A survey in this area is beyond the limited scope of this Article. 
206 WTO, INDIA - PATENT PROT. FOR PHARMACEUTICAL & AGRIC. CHEM. PRODS.: 
COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED STATES, WT/DS50/AB/R, ¶ 62 (1997), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
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March 1995, six weeks after the reassembly of Parliament.  
This was followed by an unsuccessful effort to enact the 
Patents (Amendment) Bill 1995 to implement the contents 
of the Ordinance on a permanent basis.  This Bill was 
introduced in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) in March 
1995.  After being passed by the Lok Sabha, it was referred 
to a Select Committee of the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) 
for examination and report.  However, the Bill was 
subsequently not enacted due to the dissolution of 
Parliament on 10 May 1996.207 
This demonstrates that even though the willingness to fulfill 
the mailbox requirement was there, political changes, such as the 
dissolution of the Indian parliament, resulted in the failure to pass 
the bill that would have precisely enabled India to comply with this 
obligation. 
Furthermore, some developing countries might have higher 
priorities than implementing laws to protect intellectual property.  
Factors such as being at war, political instability, or economic 
struggles come into play when it comes to prioritizing legislation, 
in addition to cultural differences, which might also play a 
significant role.  Five or ten years may be not sufficient in the face 
of such circumstances.  Developed countries should not be so 
prompt to judge others and should exercise pressure mindfully. 
B. International Pressure 
Moral pressure flowing from its adherence to the Paris 
Convention, with Berne being chosen as headquarters for the 
Central Bureau of the Union, and direct pressure exercised by 
Germany aided by the United States from 1897 to 1907 had a 
significant impact on the Swiss government’s willingness to 
submit a new referendum to the people to amend the Constitution 
and change the law.208  The National Council took seriously the 
threats of retaliatory measures, either by an increase in the tariffs 
or within the Paris Convention.209  What worked for Switzerland, 
 
207 Id. 
208 See SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 89, 93–94. 
209 See id. 
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however, may not provide a solution for another nation.  The 
circumstances differ for each country.  Henceforth, the hardest part 
will be to evaluate the type and the amount of pressure needed to 
tip the balance favorably and obtain a positive response. 
Although the international pressure was important in 
Switzerland’s case, history shows that it was not driven solely by 
concern for the well being of Switzerland, but by Germany’s own 
national concerns to protect its industries, inventors, and the 
German dyestuff cartel.210  It was a clash between one “selfish” 
position against another.  While Germany wanted to protect its 
industries, Switzerland was trying to preserve its free riders.  The 
same is still true today: the developed countries, including the 
United States, are more virulent with their unilateral trade 
measures under the Special 301 provision under the Trade Act of 
1974 to fight against free riders.  U.S. Trade Representative 
Zoellick stated that 
U.S. creativity and ingenuity improves the lives of people 
all over the world.  American innovators, like our scientists, 
artists and writers, rely on intellectual property protection 
to safeguard their inventions and creations.  Strong 
[intellectual property rights] protection should also be a 
priority for other countries because it will help them attract 
investment and technology . . . This report reflects the 
Administration’s continued commitment to ensure effective 
intellectual property protection around the world.211 
Only experience will show whether the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism can balance the tension between developed 
countries, who want the maximum protection for intellectual 
property, and developing countries, who believe that some free 
riding is needed to enhance their industrialization, while 
restraining pressure to an adequate level. 
 
210 See id. at 93–94. 
211 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Releases Annual “Special 301” 
Report on Global Intellectual Property Protection (Apr. 30, 2002) (quoting U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert B. Zoellick), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/-
2002/04/02-48.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2004). 
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C. Influence of the Experiences of Other Countries 
The laws and the experiences of the neighboring countries 
influenced the way the Swiss industries and government 
appreciated patent protection.  At first, Switzerland’s perception 
was very negative—it seemed that the concept was not defined 
well enough, that it was hindering the development of the 
industries, and that it was restraining free trade and creating 
monopolies instead.212  With time, however, Switzerland realized 
that a patent law could also have advantages, that it could preserve 
the national industries from foreign competition, stimulate the 
development of the industries by giving incentives to inventors, 
and avoid the emigration of scholars and scientists who sought 
better protection for their intellectual products.  It is, therefore, 
important to allow developing countries—and even more so for the 
least developed countries–to carve their own paths.  Indeed, the 
patent laws of the developed countries have evolved.  They were 
perfected and improved for over a century alongside the 
industrialization and development of their industries.  Therefore, is 
it realistic to impose the implementation of minimal requirements 
drafted to suit the standards of the developed countries in such a 
short period of time? 
CONCLUSION 
Although the protagonists and the circumstances are different, 
history is played anew every century.  Countries with patent 
protection use international treaties and other means to convince 
the nations that have not yet enacted such protection to do so.  
Switzerland’s experience shows that generalization is impossible, 
considering that each country has its own problems, struggles, and 
opponents.  Perseverance, patience, and some pressure do seem to 
work, however, and eventually, developing countries like 
Switzerland will realize that their position is not endurable any 
longer.  They also will ultimately come to understand that the 
disadvantages of patent protection are outweighed by the 
advantages it can bring them.  Such balancing takes time and 
 
212 See Message of 1903, supra note 112, at 51. 
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involves broader economic consideration, but ultimately it comes 
down to assessing the impact of granting better incentives to 
national industries to invent new products as opposed to allowing 
them to “rob” the inventions of other countries and, thus, reduce 
the cost for the consumer. 
The reality for developing the least developed countries still 
resisting patent protection laws is that the most important battle in 
this fight has long been solved in favor of protection.  As one 
commentator remarked, “Nowadays, it’s hard to find any rock-
ribbed, dyed-in-the-wool patent abolitionists.  Indeed, it is hard to 
find any patent abolitionists at all.  Contemporary patent policy 
debates seem invariably to start form the premise that the patent 
system is a ‘fait accompli.’”213  This may not be so much due to its 
intrinsic virtues or advantages, rather because this system has 
existed for such a long period of time: 
If we did not have a patent system, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its 
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.  
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it 
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.214 
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